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Joe Goddard, Lektor, 
Institut for kultur og globale studier, Aalborg Universitet. 
I Am Canadian: Immigration 
and Multiculturalism in the True North?
Canada has been a land of immigration since the 
first European settlers arrived around 400 years 
ago. Then, the country’s “first nations” (as Can-
ada’s founding indigenous peoples are called) 
numbered perhaps one million. First nations to-
day account around for roughly the same number, 
yet the nation’s total population is much larger, 
at around 34.3 million.a Most settlers of modern 
Canada, therefore, stem from elsewhere, and in 
the main, arrived quite recently (see Table 1 for 
largest groups). 
Table 1: 
Self-Reported Ethnicity in Canada, 2006 
Canadian ca. 30%
English ca. 20%
French ca. 16%
Scottish ca. 15%
Irish ca. 14%
German ca. 10%
Italian ca.   4%
Chinese ca.   4%
First Nations ca.   4%
Ukranian ca.   4%
Scandinavian ca.   4%
South Asian ca.   4%
Black Canadians ca.   2.5%
Source: Census Canada
(Includes multiple self-identification)
Indeed, Canada’s immigration is quite remarkable 
in that its magnitude remains higher than many 
other settler societies. Approximately 250,000 
immigrants make the country their home every 
year.b This rate equates to that of the massive 
settlement by Europeans at the end of the nine-
teenth and beginning of the twentieth century, so 
Canada’s ethnic makeup, illustrated in the table 
above, is dynamic, to say the least (see Figure 1, 
below).
Figure 1: Immigration to Canada 
in raw numbers, 1860-2010
(source: citizenship and Immigration Canada, Facts and Figu-
res 2009 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/
facts2009/permanent/index.asp)
Up until the 1950s, immigration to Canada came 
overwhelmingly from European countries (UK) 
and the U.S., with little and restricted immigra-
tion from elsewhere. In 2007-9 most immigration 
came from Asia, notably from China, the Philip-
pines, and the Indian subcontinent. (see Table 2)
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Table 2: Permanent Residents 
by Source Area, 2007-2009
(Source: CIC, op cit)
One important prism through which Canadian 
immigration policy can be seen is the relation-
ship with its southern neighbor, the U.S. Since 
American independence in the 1770s, the two na-
tions have exchanged populations, with each be-
ing one of the other’s greatest sources of citizens; 
from the migration of Loyalists to Ontario and the 
Maritimes in the 1780s, to the outspreading of 
Quebecois into Northern New England and New 
York in the early twentieth century. Most times, 
however, Canadian emigration to the U.S. has sur-
passed immigration from the U.S. Recently, much 
has been made of the “Brain Drain” of highly qual-
ified and successful Canadians heading south to 
the U.S.; including journalists (Charles Krautham-
mer, David Frum), towering public intellectu-
als (J.K. Galbraith, Michael Ignatieff ); a governor 
(Jennifer Granholm in Michigan), not to mention 
almost the entire cast of the first Star Trek series 
(William Shatner as “Jim Kirk” and James Doohan 
as “Scottie”).
Canadian society was bifurcated until the 1780s, 
with a growing and protected religious (Catholi-
cism) and cultural (French) tradition in Quebec 
and along the Great Lakes, and an amalgam of 
first nations trading with both French and Ang-
lo North America. The American Revolution ulti-
mately “created” two states; the U.S., and Canada, 
as after the revolution thousands of refugees – 
British Empire Loyalists – flooded into Southern 
Ontario and the Maritimes regions from the new-
ly independent U.S., establishing and strength-
ening the third of Canada’s three founding tra-
ditions. War with the U.S. in 1812, tension over 
boundaries in northern Maine and on the Pacif-
ic Coast, continuous sub-national antagonisms 
such as the Irish-minded Fenians, and a belief 
that the U.S. would come to control the whole of 
America north of the Rio Grande made “British” 
North Americans painfully aware of their vulne-
rability. Immigration came to be seen as essential 
in maintaining control above the 49th parallel and 
in developing commerce based on the territory’s 
vast natural wealth, especially as U.S. population, 
production and power exploded. 
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Angli-
cans in Ontario and Catholics in Quebec held priv-
ileged positions, eff ectively as established church-
es and societies. However, increasing Protestant 
diversity, resentment over the restrictive hold 
that the Catholic Church had in Quebec, and frus-
tration over unrepresentative governance helped 
fuel popular unrest which ultimately led to more 
open religious and political societies (1830-
1867). Canada’s two major political groupings 
parties, the Conservative (Anglican, tradition-
al Catholic) and the Liberal (dissenting Protes-
tants, and Quebecois agnostics) reflected sectar-
ian diff erence. While Canadian immigration was 
less influenced by established churches and un-
representative government from the 1860s, im-
migrants were increasingly categorized accord-
ing to their supposed desirability, suitability, and 
innate abilities to deal with the Canadian geog-
raphy and climate. Ideas of cultural diff erence 
and distance aff ected Canadian policy during the 
early twentieth century, reflected in immigration 
rules which were tightened from the 1920s. Fa-
vored immigrants included peoples of the Brit-
ish Isles and other northwest Europeans, while 
less-favored groups counted southern Europe-
ans among their numbers. Undesirables includ-
ed Asians and Blacks, labor radicals, leftists, the 
sick, and the sexually “deviant” thinkers. These 
groups were restricted or limited by head-taxes. 
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Many similarities emerged between the immigra-
tion policies and the timing of changes between 
the US and Canada, and between types of immi-
gration and popular dissatisfaction: perhaps pre-
dictably so as Canada orientated itself southward 
to the U.S., rather than eastward to the U.K.
Breaking with forty years of restrictive policy 
which had sought to retain the ethnic origins of 
the nation, immigration policy was drastically al-
tered from the 1960s and 1970s. Mass immigra-
tion resumed – now based on a mix of economic 
and social strength rather than country of origin. 
Milestones in the opening up of policy included 
the allowance of Dual Nationality in 1977, the en-
sconcing of Multiculturalism in the constitution 
in 1982, and governmental planning to increase 
immigration by sixty percent to two-hundred 
and fifty thousand a year by 1992 (see Figure 2: 
Modern Milestones in Canadian Immigration Pol-
icy below). Again, it is worth drawing attention to 
the importance of the U.S. on Canadian immigra-
tion policy. From about 1970, and especially dur-
ing the Trudeau era (1968-84), Canadians sought 
for ways to diff erentiate themselves from their 
southern neighbors.c Liberalism, tolerance, mul-
ticulturalism, pacifism, and an extensive social 
state came to form a civil credo which helped Ca-
nadians distinguish themselves from Americans 
– Canada the good rather than USA the powerful. 
Immigration and multiculturalism thus became 
emblems of pride and diff erence for many Cana-
dians. And indeed Canadian exponents of immi-
gration often prided themselves on the diversity-
enhancing mosaic they were creating in contrast 
to the American melting pot.
Figure 2: Modern Milestones
 In Canadian Immigration Policy
1967  Non Discriminatory Immigration 
introduced. Specifies objectives, 
obliges federal govt. to create plan 
for immigration
1971  Bilingualism and Multiculturalism 
are announced as federal government 
policies
1977   Citizenship Act. 
Dual nationalities permitted
1982   Multiculturalism specified 
in repatriated constitution
1990   Immigration targets rose to 
250,000 annually 
2002   Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act 
(coherence for integration)
2006   Lebanon Crisis Many thousand 
Canadians caught up by Israeli 
military action
2009   Restriction of Canadian Citizenship 
to children born abroad
Yet all was not roses. While at one level intoler-
ance of cultural or racial tolerance became anti-
Canadian and thus largely unacceptable, on the 
other hand, attitudes didn’t always follow pol-
icy. Canadian politicians recognized that their 
slow natural rate of population growth and skills 
Foto: Lisbeth B
asballe
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shortages meant that Canada would benefit from 
mass immigration. Simultaneously many Canadi-
ans came to see an economically-optimal level of 
immigration as socially and culturally unaccept-
able. Moreover, Canada’s impressive immigration 
was distributed unevenly across the country, and 
heavily concentrated on Toronto (absorbing near 
45%), with Vancouver and Montreal following. In 
some senses, this was a clear recipe for aggrava-
tion of city-country diff erences, and the already 
unfamiliar cities became more cosmopolitan and 
thus foreign to a native population.
At this point we need to return to the ideas of 
founding Canadian myths. In 1867 through the 
Constitution Act Canada was formed of two fairly 
evenly balanced linguistic cultures; Anglophone 
and Francophone, see the Cartoon below. Howev-
er, due to the expansion of national territory and 
the preferences of immigrants to settle in Anglo-
phone Canada, the distribution and relationship 
between the two linguistic communities skewed. 
Currently perhaps 30% of Canada’s population is 
francophone, while closer to 70% is Anglophone. 
The dynamics of immigration has upset the bal-
ance between two of the founding nations – to 
such an extent that immigration policy to Que-
bec was eff ectively repatriated from the federal 
government in 1991, to allow that society more 
control. 
Cartoon: Early Bilingualism and Biculturalism: 
Compromise a necessity. Note the Union Jack, 
Tricoleur, and Fleur-de-Lis.
In recent times, as has already been suggested, 
the founding myth has been widened to include 
the evident contribution of the aboriginal or First 
Nation population. Indeed, at a 2006 conference 
at Copenhagen Business School, the then Cana-
dian Ambassador Mary Simon (herself part Inu-
it) could talk of the three founding nations: Eng-
lish, French and Native. In many ways, Simon’s 
appointment buttressed Canada’s multicultur-
al status and confirmed the transnational fluid-
ity of current borders for the peoples of the Arc-
tic north in Canada and Denmark. But to return, 
the three foundational nations of the country un-
derline that not only is Canada multicultural to-
day; but it has been so since the peoples met af-
ter 1600. This is a re-reading of Canadian history, 
as Canada’s immigration policies were blatant-
ly prejudiced until the 1960s, biased in terms of 
politics, and prejudicial in terms of sexual orien-
tation.
While Canada today is largely regarded as a fair-
ly eff ective example of how immigration works 
in affluent and liberal states, a backlash has 
emerged. The anguish of the 9/11 terror attacks 
incited fear and suspicion, not least south of the 
world’s longest unguarded border. Indeed many 
Americans fretted over the possibility of terror-
ists crossing from the north, and some Canadians 
correspondingly began to see recent immigrants 
in a more sinister light. Canada’s southern bor-
der tightened as a consequence, with instances 
of people claiming that stereotyping – racial and 
ethnic profiling – was practiced at entry points to 
the U.S. These incidents arguably fed into and fed 
off  strands of antipathy towards specific visible 
minorities (Muslims and people of Middle-East-
ern origins) in Canada, and facilitated an atmo-
sphere of suspicion. However, general hysteria 
and ill-will in North America (despite the protes-
tations of then President George W. Bush) was to 
have a more specific manifestation in Canada.
During the summer of 2006, bombs reined on 
Beirut and southern Lebanon from Israeli planes 
and artillery, in response to missile attacks by He-
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zbollah on Northern Israel. A major humanitarian 
tragedy unfolded, with severe destruction of Leb-
anese infrastructure and significant loss of life. 
In response to the growing dangers, many peo-
ple fled from the fighting, with overseas passport 
holders seeking refuge abroad. The eff ect on Can-
ada was as huge as it was unexpected: The left-
liberal Toronto Star estimated that fifty thousand 
Canadian nationals were caught in the crossfire. 
Nearly fifteen thousand citizens demanded repa-
triation from the Canadian government: despite 
the majority being permanently resident and 
holding ancestral links there.d 
The Israeli-Lebanon crisis uncovered Canada’s 
attitudes towards immigration and opened de-
bates on the consequences of immigration. To be 
fair, already prior to the crisis some commenta-
tors questioned whether Canada’s immigration 
policy could continue to work. Professor Andrew 
Cohen, writing in the Toronto Star, called Canada 
a “virtual country”, “Hotel Canada,” and as a “hol-
low country” in an essay on Canada’s near future.e
Daniel Stoff man, also writing for the Toronto 
Star, wondered over immigration’s role in envi-
ronmental attrition, as eager new citizens landed. 
To improve social, economic, and environmental 
conditions, Stoff mann argued, Canada needed to 
return to its pre-1992 more moderate immigra-
tion levels (150,000 new arrivals a year).f The 
Lebanon crisis suggested that some people saw 
their Canadian identities as insurance policies, 
and indeed, that many citizens were uninterested 
in permanent residence.
In response to the critiques of off shore Canadi-
ans, a Toronto Star editorial argued staunchly in 
its headline, that “Dual citizens all [are] equally 
Canadians,” noting that aid and support for peo-
ple with two passports was necessary in a glo-
balizing world as “Canada is desperate for skilled 
and educated immigrants to keep our economy 
humming.”g Two days later, the same newspaper 
celebrated the fleeing citizens as the contempo-
Foto Peter B
akker
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rary heirs of nineteenth century Irish and others.h
As the saga continued, Statistics Canada sought to 
estimate downwards the numbers of Lebanese-
Canadian nationals in Lebanon (the community 
numbers some 140,000 Christian and Muslims in 
all) to less than fifty thousand.
While many back home watched the Canadian 
repatriation eff ort with a measure of bemuse-
ment and pride – bemusement over the num-
bers of stuck Canucks, pride over the logistical 
support given by the government, some voices 
on both sides of the world wondered whether 
Canada had done too little too late to protect its 
citizens. In the spinning of the evacuation yarn, 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper – who was in Eu-
rope on official business – commanded his Prime 
Ministerial jet towards Cyprus to help pick up ref-
uges. The Premier’s actions – a pretty transpar-
ent publicity stunt involving predictable photo-
ops – aimed to relieve the domestic pressure on 
the government for its purported sloth in getting 
Canadians out.
Macleans weekly newsmagazine tried to report 
both sides of the story, quoting worried Montre-
aler Youssef Hariri who was anxious about his 
sister in Baalbec, Lebanon. Hariri alleged that “If 
there is no help (from Canada) ....there will be a 
humanitarian crisis,” before comparing Canadian 
eff orts unfavorably to the French. Humanitarian 
concerns were legitimate: some Canadians lost 
their lives in the 2006 bombardment of Lebanon. 
Others praised Canada’s concerted and timely ac-
tion. Bernard Chucri, on being speedily repatri-
ated, exclaimed “I can’t say enough thanks....They 
are trying their best to get every Canadian out of 
here.”i 
Terence Corcoran, in the rightist National Post, 
took issue with the supposed magnitude of repa-
triates, asking “Since when has a ‘fast exit’ been a 
Foto: Lisbeth B
asballe
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right?” Zeroing in on the purported divided loyal-
ties of dual citizens, Corcoran surmised that some 
people could think: “Let’s see. If there’s war in 
Lebanon, then today I’m a Canadian.”j Corcoran 
argued that Canadian moral obligations towards 
her (dual) nationals had been trumpeted in the 
liberal press, not least in the centrist Globe and 
Mail and the Toronto Star. Neo-conservative Mark 
Steyn, reporting for Macleans, struck a similar 
chord, noting that “The scandal isn’t about tawdry 
evacuation; it’s that we’ve fostered so many indif-
ferent citizens.” Steyn argued –with more than a 
grain of accuracy – that “Canadian seemed to be 
everybody’s second nationality,” a citizenship 
concept which was “a fallback position, some-
thing to have in the back pocket when the powder 
keg goes off .”k Steyn articulates latent critiques of 
Canada, that potential citizens want the passport, 
but are lukewarm about the country, and of its 
muscular immigration policy which, perhaps, is 
less of a success than many would like to believe. 
Canada’s beacon-like draw is diminished in this 
reading. In terms of language, few people would 
have a problem with Danish-Canadian. But Cana-
dian-Danish, or Canadian-British? It seems the 
hyphen is unidirectional, and, reflexively, that the 
Canadian side of identity is secondary.
Then again, introspection over what it means 
to be Canadian is nothing new. For much of the 
twentieth century politicians and others argued 
over whether “Canadianness” could safely con-
tain two or more identities. Speaking in March 
1958, and pleading for an unitary Canadian iden-
tity, Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbak-
er famously remarked that he was “determined 
to bring about a Canadian citizenship that knew 
no hyphenated consideration,” whereas a decade 
or so later Liberals under Pierre Trudeau claimed 
unity through multicultural diversity. Eminent 
Canadian historian J.L. Granatstein, writing in the 
2006 refugee aftermath, mused over the coun-
Canadian Citizenship Ceremony held by Governor-General the Right Honorable Michaëlle Jean 
(not in shot) in Ottawa, 2007.  
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tries’ overlapping, refracted, and transnation-
al identities. Granatstein trained his analysis on 
identity issues through the outflow from Leba-
non and noted that many of the country’s puta-
tive citizens rescued “had lived in Lebanon for 
decades.” In this whirl of citizen’s settlement 
preferences and potential governmental policy 
responses Granatstein mused over what, precise-
ly, Canadian citizenship could or should mean in 
a globalized world.l
As the crisis ebbed out, the political and opinion 
fallout continued to spread: Garth Turner, then-
Independent MP, asked of the repatriates, “If they 
don’t live here, and they don’t pay taxes, and may 
never be coming back, what is the responsibili-
ty of the government of Canada supported by the 
Canadian taxpayer?” As a result, think tanks and 
the like began to explore ways of encouraging en-
hanced allegiances to Canada and reducing the 
amount of people using the Canadian “passport 
package” as a lifeline. Suggestions included much 
higher passport renewal costs for non-residents, 
eliminating dual citizenship, and reducing over-
seas residents’ access to subsidized further edu-
cation. By so doing “free riders” would cost Ca-
nadian taxpayers less, as well as enhancing a link 
between citizenship and civic pride.m
Garth struck a populist chord with middle-class 
suburban Canadians who wanted to believe that 
some immigrants – or “dualies” as they became 
known wanted to “be” us without being “us.” The 
estimated $CAN 85 million to the taxpayer played 
in, aggravating “either-or” conceptions of nation-
ality which clashed with “and” which transcend-
ed single identities. Racism was perhaps also 
present: writing in Macleans, Luiza Savage point-
ed out that many white Canadians were also “du-
alies” without this seeming a problem, including 
ninety thousand British citizens. Canadian iden-
tity had for Savage never been as definitively and 
oppositionally-formed as the American (in the 
revolutionary crucible), while the swirling and 
mixing identities actually helped foster a grad-
ual acquisition of Canadian values.n The key re-
mained in the integration process, meeting with 
open minds and the acceptance of a metaphorical 
“mosaic” or “tapestry” (each ethnicity a thread in 
a larger picture) approach to identity and avoid-
ing complacency. Political scientist Norman Hill-
mer – interviewed on the CTV.CA website, warned 
that complacency towards inclusiveness could 
soon lead to internal struggle, disagreement and 
backlash.o Before the 2008 recession Canada’s 
relatively robust economy meant rising wages for 
skilled people and occasionally massive recruit-
ment problems for contractors – despite a quar-
ter of a million arrivals a year.
Canadian Census data suggests that an elemen-
tal self-reported identity of Canadianness actual-
ly declined during the new millennium. In 2001, 
thirty-nine percent of Canadians self-identified 
as Canadian rather than any other ethno-nation-
al group. By 2006, this number had fallen, actu-
ally by nearly a fifth, to thirty-two percent.p There 
are at least two major ways of seeing this greater 
diversity. An optimist could claim that Canada’s 
unique, liberal and evolving construction allows 
its citizens the freedom for them to see them-
selves in diverse terms, rather than coercing them 
to accept that their basic nature be assimilated. 
The more pessimistically-minded could point to a 
turn towards ethnicity as a fundamental marker 
of identity which trumps allegiance to a political 
credo, and indeed might argue that Canada’s im-
migration rates of around 0.8% of total popula-
Foto: Anne Lie Schneider
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tion a year are likely feeding diff erentiation. In-
deed, for the right, this diff erentiation, labeled 
“social experimentation” seems deliberate.q 
Fictional “Joe Canuck Sixpack” created as an ad-
vertising ploy by Molson brewers, although ob-
viously male and white, let loose a diatribe in a 
commercial which touched a chord with many Ca-
nadians. Sixpack tried to define what made Cana-
dians diff erent from Americans below the border, 
the basic oppositional of Canadian identity thus: 
“I am Canadian.... I have a prime minister, not a 
president: I speak English and French, not Ameri-
can... I can proudly sew my country’s flag on my 
backpack. I believe in peacekeeping, not policing; 
diversity, not assimilation.” This is the alluring 
self-image of the friendly giant: moral, accepting, 
understanding, and Definitely Not American. Yet 
the white middle class Canadians whom Sixpack 
spoke to and for seemed likely to dwindle in rela-
tive standing as Canada became increasingly di-
verse in complexion and attitudes – thanks to im-
migration-fuelled population growth.r 
That is not where Canada’s unfolding story as im-
migration destination ends, however. Of the one-
quarter of a million people who enter the country 
as new residents every year, around two-thirds 
(170,000) seek Canadian citizenship, for which 
they are eligible after three years of residence in 
Canada. Citizenship criteria include knowledge 
of English or French, and successful comple-
tion of a citizenship test. Processing applicants’ 
paperwork currently takes around 19 months. 
If the application is successful, the applicant is 
then required to take an oath of citizenship, with 
the oath either taken on the religious book cho-
sen by the applicant or as an affirmation for the 
non-religiously minded.s This public act of alle-
giance confirms the applicant as a full-member of 
the Canadian polity. Following the ceremony, the 
newly-minted citizen is issued with certification 
of citizenship. Thus the entire process can be ac-
commodated in a little more than five years. As 
can be seen from Photograph 1, the citizenship 
ceremony is often understood as a celebration: of 
unity and diversity.
Noter
a   See the Statistics Canada starting webpage at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/start-debut-eng.html.
b   See Citizenship and Immigration Canada News Release: Government of Canada Tables 2010 Immigration Plan http://www.cic.gc.ca/
english/department/media/releases/2009/2009-10-30.asp.
c   Pierre Trudeau served as Canada’s Prime Minister during most of this period.
d   See Editorial “Dual Citizens all Equally Canadian,” in the Toronto Star July 21, 2006.
e   See Andrew Cohen, “A Virtual Country”, in the Toronto Star, July 5, 2006.
f   See Daniel Stoff man, “When Immigration Goes Awry,” in the Toronto Star, July 14, 2006.
g  See Editorial, op cit.
h   Andrew Chung, “A Painful Constant through History,” in the Toronto Star, July 23, 2006.
i   Michael Friscolanti & Danylo Hawaleskhan, “The Long Road Home,” in Macleans Magazine, July 31, 2006.
j   Terence Corcoran, “Since When Has a Fast Exit Been a Right,” in the National Post, July 20, 2006.
k   Mark Steyn, “50,000 Problematic Canadians,” in Macleans, August 1, 2006.
l   J.L.Granatstein, ”Conflicted over Citizenship,” in Globe and Mail, July 31, 2006.
m   John Chant, “Backgrounder -The Passport Package. Rethinking the Citizenship Benefits of Non-Resident Canadians, The C.D. Howe In-
stitute, No. 99, 2006.
n   Luiza Savage, “O Canada, Do We Stand on Guard for Thee?” Macleans, August 7, 2006.
o   Mary Nersessian, “Canada: Celebrating a Nation of Immigrants,” in CTV.CA, October 10, 2006.
p   Toby Cohen, “Canadian Ethnicity Popular,” Toronto Star, April 2, 2008.
q   George Jonas, “Trudeau’s Cultural ‘Mosaic’ a Failed Social Experiment,” National Post Sept 20, 2011. 
r  Ibid.
s   Citizenship and Immigration Canada, ”How to Become a Canadian Citizen,” online at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/citizenship/in-
dex.asp.
